The government wants to collect iris scans and DNA from all people entering the country. Privacy advocates say it marks a troubling escalation.
The U.S. government is moving forward with plans to collect biometric data including iris scans and DNA samples from citizens and noncitizens alike. The expansion represents a significant step in the nation's growing surveillance infrastructure, one that observers say has accelerated far beyond what many Americans expected or would have approved of just a decade ago.
The implications are substantial. Biometric data, unlike passwords or PINs, cannot be changed if compromised. Once an iris scan or DNA profile is leaked or misused, there is no recovery. Commenters have raised concerns about the permanence of this vulnerability, pointing to past breaches of supposedly secure systems and noting that biometric information left at crime scenes could be weaponized to frame innocent people. The technology itself, some observers note, is not infallible. Fingerprint analysis and DNA matching have both been sources of wrongful convictions in the past.
What struck many in the community discussing this development was not shock at the announcement itself, but resignation. Commenters expressed frustration that despite widespread public disapproval of surveillance expansion, there appears to be no meaningful political opposition. And this should be surprising for anyone familiar with information security.
According to those in the community, neither major political party has made dismantling surveillance a priority, and several noted that individual politicians advocating against such measures are vanishingly rare at every level of government. The consensus seemed to be that the public, while opposed, has become effectively powerless to resist.
The debate also touched on a deeper question: whether privacy is even viable anymore. Some argued that as data collection becomes cheaper and easier, these databases will be built regardless of who builds them, whether government, corporations, or criminal networks. Others countered that surveillance capitalism is a choice, not an inevitability, and that strong regulation could make data collection unprofitable.
The disagreement reflected a fundamental tension between technological possibility and political will. This is also a topic that comes up in ethical hacking courses; how much information to give, to whom, and the repercussions of those choices.
What emerges from the discussion is a portrait of a society grappling with the permanence of biometric systems and the apparent absence of institutional checks to prevent their misuse. Whether this expansion proceeds largely unopposed or faces unexpected resistance may depend on whether that political will can be summoned before the infrastructure becomes too entrenched to challenge.
You can read the document, released by DHS, at the Federal Register. One notable quote comes from section II.A. It says that DHS has the authority "...to collect or require submission of biometrics from: applicants, petitioners, and beneficiaries for immigration benefits; any individual filing or associated with a benefit request, other request, or collection of information; and from aliens upon their arrest for purposes of processing, care, custody, and initiation of removal proceedings."
